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PREVIEW; Kaul v. State Farm: “From the roof tear to the wall,
when a policy can’t cover it all” Does the Doctrine of Efficient
Proximate Cause Precede Insurance Policy Language in Montana?
Hannah Willstein*
Oral Argument is scheduled for Wednesday, January 6, 2021, at 9:30
a.m., and will be conducted telephonically. Lincoln Palmer and Rexford
L. Palmer will likely appear for the Appellants, Gary and Carolyn Kaul,
and Bradley Luck and Katelyn Hepburn will likely appear for the
Appellee, State Farm. The Appellants have allotted five minutes of their
time for Amicus Curiae arguments from the Montana Trial Lawyers
Association, on behalf of whom Domenic Cossi will likely appear.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents questions about insurance coverage in Montana.
The Court will decide whether Montana’s “efficient proximate cause
doctrine” mandates coverage for water damage to a recreational vehicle’s
(“RV”) wall, and whether the wall repair is covered as a mitigation
expense, assuming the repair was necessary to protect the RV from
additional damage.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gary and Carolyn Kaul were driving their RV in March 2017, when
the vehicle’s roof membrane was torn by a tree.1 Later, while the RV was
in storage in Missoula, rain got in through the tear, damaging the RV’s
wall.2 The Kauls noticed this damage in May and June.3 State Farm paid
for the roof’s repair, but denied coverage for the wall repair and the related
expenses.4 The Kauls sued to obtain coverage, alleging State Farm should
have covered all the expenses and repair costs along with the roof repair.5
The Kauls moved for summary judgment on the issue of coverage of
the wall damage to their RV and the expenses they incurred to protect the
RV from further damage.6 State Farm cross-moved for summary
judgment, alleging the clear and unambiguous language of the State Farm
Recreational Vehicle Policy (“Policy”) precludes coverage for the wall
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damage.7 State Farm prevailed on summary judgment as to the wall
damage,8 but the Kauls prevailed as to their expenses.9
The district court concluded the Policy’s definition of loss as “direct,
sudden, and accidental damage” is unambiguous; the damage must be all
three, not just “direct.”10 Thus, the court found the proximate cause
analysis was not proper, because this doctrine does not account for the
Policy’s language.11 The court found there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding water damage to the RV wall12 and concluded the
water damage to the wall was not a covered loss under the policy, because
it did not result from sudden damage. Thus, partial summary judgment was
granted in favor of State Farm.13 The district court found State Farm must
pay any reasonable expenses incurred to protect the RV from additional
damage.14 Excluding the expenses arising directly from the repair to the
RV wall, this award was calculated to be $3,177.00.15
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Kaul’s Argument

Appellant’s arguments on appeal are: (1) Montana’s “efficient
proximate cause doctrine” mandates coverage of the water damage to the
RV wall; (2) 34 minutes of water entry into the RV wall constitutes
“sudden damage” because the RV required repair; and (3) the wall repair
is covered as a mitigation expense because expert testimony states it was
necessary to protect the RV from additional damage.16 Appellant states
how Green v. Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins. Co.17 introduced the doctrine of
efficient proximate cause, thus mandating coverage of subsequent loss
proximately caused by a covered loss.18 This doctrine is sometimes applied
when the subsequent loss is not covered.19
Appellants explain Appellee conceded coverage of the roof tear, and
how the roof tear proximately caused the wall damage.20 They argue
Montana's efficient proximate cause doctrine mandates coverage of the
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wall repair because the roof tear proximately caused the wall damage.21
Appellant also maintains that if a court applies a reasonable interpretation
of “damage” as “loss of value” or “need to repair” to the Policy, the water
entering the RV was sudden damage and thus should be covered.22
Appellant contends the Policy requires the insureds to protect the RV
from additional damage, and in turn, requires State Farm to pay for such
mitigation.23 Appellant’s expert testified that after the roof tore and
allowed water entry, it was necessary to repair the wall to protect the RV
from additional damage.24 Appellant argues the district court erred by
declining to judicially notice Appellant’s weather data because the data
proves the damage was sudden, since it highlights how more than two
gallons of rain entered the RV wall in 34 minutes.25
In summation, Appellant argues the Court should reverse the entry of
summary judgment against him, because the efficient proximate cause
doctrine applies to the Policy even though it requires the damage or loss
to be “sudden.” Next, Appellant states the Court should hold the wall
damage is a covered loss because the water entry qualifies as sudden
damage when reasonably defined. Finally, Appellant argues the Court
should hold the Policy’s mitigation clause required him to remove and
repair the wall to protect the RV from additional damage, and thus requires
State Farm to pay for the removal and repair.
B. Appellee State Farm’s Argument
Appellee argues Montana’s efficient proximate cause doctrine does
not mandate coverage under the Kauls’ circumstances, and the
unambiguous Policy terms at issue do not provide coverage for the RV
damage, nor the costs of mitigation.26 Appellee argues Appellant’s use of
Green and Park Saddle Horse Co. v. Royal Indemnity Company,27 which
found coverage as a result of efficient proximate cause, is inappropriate
because the rulings are narrow.28 According to Appellee, in those cases,
the subsequent losses at issue fell within coverage—if the loss was
excluded, the doctrine was applied to overcome an applicable exclusion
because it was not superseding specific policy language.29 Appellee also
argues that Appellant’s mitigation argument should be waived because he
failed to raise it at the district court level.30
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Appellee argues the Policy is unambiguous, and the proximate cause
doctrine cannot be used to rewrite unambiguous policy language or to
ignore key terms in favor of coverage.31 Appellee contends the district
court’s holding balances contract law with Park Saddle and Green,32 and
reversing its holding will have the effect of rewriting the Kauls’ Policy.33
According to Appellee, the Court has held the efficient proximate cause
doctrine may apply to broaden the interpretation of a policy but cannot
ignore clear and unambiguous policy language.34
Appellee also challenges Amicus’s argument advocating for
adoption of a limitless efficient proximate cause doctrine.35 Appellee
argues the undisputed grant of coverage in the Policy is clear and
unambiguous, and a limitless application of the efficient proximate cause
doctrine is not supported by Montana law, nor consistent with public
policy.36
Appellee maintains the district court’s holding was correct because
the Policy’s terms are unambiguous.37 Appellee claims the damage to the
RV wall is not a covered loss, because it is not sudden damage, and instead
apprises the Court to reject Appellant’s interpretation of the Policy.
Courts, Appellee contends, “may not rewrite the contract at issue, but must
enforce it as written if its language is clear and explicit.”38
C. Amicus MTLA’s Argument
The Montana Trial Lawyers Association (“MTLA”) argues the Court
should re-endorse and clarify the efficient proximate cause doctrine.39
MTLA states that the efficient proximate cause doctrine is good law, and
insurance consumers in Montana should be granted coverage for all
proximately caused insured risks.40 MTLA asserts the doctrine complies
with Montana law, public policy, and the “reasonable expectations of
coverage” doctrine.41 This doctrine requires objectively reasonable
expectations of policy holders be honored even if minutiae of certain
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.42 MTLA
maintains the efficient proximate cause doctrine provides insureds with
what a reasonable person would expect from an insurance policy.43 MTLA
31
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contends an ordinary consumer would not expect to have coverage on such
things as tree and hail damage, but not on consequential damages, such as
the water infiltration here. MTLA argues the Court should expand the
public policy benefits of larger coverage expectations for people in
Montana.44
IV.

ANALYSIS

The main issue here is whether the RV’s wall damage is a covered
loss. In the past, the Court has narrowly ruled on efficient proximate cause
and has never let the doctrine override unambiguous policy language. The
outcome could change coverage law in Montana.
It is longstanding Montana law that damages proximately caused by
a covered loss are covered under an insurance policy.45 Any ambiguity in
a policy must “be interpreted most strongly in favor of the insured and any
doubts as to coverage are to be resolved in favor of extending coverage.”46
Given the protective purpose of insurance, exclusions are to be “narrowly
and strictly construed.”47 Yet, in Montana, a court’s interpretation of an
insurance policy is a question of law.48 Courts are required to interpret the
policy’s terms according to their usual, common sense meaning, from the
perspective of a reasonable consumer of insurance products.49 The general
rule is to interpret any doubts as to coverage in favor of the insured, unless
the policy language is clear and unambiguous.50
In Park Saddle, a rancher was insured against direct loss surrounding
saddle horses, and a ranch guest fell while hiking near their horse.51 The
Park Saddle Court stated:
In determining the cause of loss for the purpose of fixing the insured’s
liability, when concurring causes of the damage appear, the proximate
cause to which the loss is to be attributed is the dominant, the efficient,
one that sets other causes in operation, and causes which are incidental
are not proximate, though they may be nearest in time and place to the
loss.52

In Green, the Court analyzed whether coverage existed for fire
damage and subsequent explosions under a policy insuring “against all
direct loss or damage by fire,” but exempting damage from explosions
unless a fire had happened first.53 The Court found the policy’s language
specifying no explosion coverage “unless fire ensues” granted coverage of
44
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the explosion.54 The Court decided that because the fire caused the
explosion, and the policy exception noted explosions caused by fire were
not exempted from coverage, the doctrine of efficient proximate cause
granted coverage of the explosion damage.
Here, the Policy’s unambiguous language covers losses that resulted
from direct, sudden, and accidental damage.55 If the Policy’s loss were
defined as direct loss, coverage would be proper under this doctrine
because the roof tear eventually caused the wall damage.56 That said,
unlike Green and Park Saddle, “loss” in the Policy is narrowly defined.
Under Montana law, there would have to be a loss as defined by the Policy
for Appellant’s wall damage to be covered.57 While the roof tear is a butfor cause of the damage to the RV wall, the wall damage is likely not a
covered loss because the Kauls cannot prove the damage was sudden.
The Court will likely reject Appellant’s argument that the rain
damage was sudden, because, by definition, damage cannot be both
sudden and gradual over multiple weeks. Appellant concedes the roof tear
happened in March or April, but a bubble was not noticed until May.58
Appellant continues to rely on NOAA evidence stating more than two
gallons of rain entered the wall in 34 minutes. That said, this statistic
addresses the amount of rainfall, not the immediacy of the water damage.
The district court rejected this argument because it presupposes the wall
damage was caused at the time of the rain, specifically on April 20. For
these reasons, the Court’s analysis concerning the nature of the rain
damage will likely fall in favor of Appellees.
As explained in Montana Precedent, the Policy’s terms must be
interpreted according to their common sense meaning, from the
perspective of a reasonable consumer, and enforced as written when clear
and unambiguous.59 For the doctrine of efficient proximate cause to
mandate the wall’s coverage, the Court would have to overturn the district
court’s ruling that the Policy’s language is unambiguous and precludes
coverage. Unlike Green and Park Saddle, the issue here turns on whether
the damage from water infiltration was sudden as a matter of law. In Kaul,
the Court should determine whether the policy’s language precludes
coverage or if a policy’s coverage can be extended by the doctrine of
efficient proximate cause.60 The Court will likely uphold the district
court’s plain meanings of “damage,” “loss,” and “sudden,” which will
most likely determine the policy language precludes coverage of the wall
damage.
54
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Appellant states the district court’s decision was wrong because it
said the Policy’s language was clear and unambiguous, thus a narrowly
construed legal doctrine could not be applied. Appellant’s unique gradual
damage situation and Policy are probably not similar enough to fall under
the precedent set in Green and Park Saddle. If the Court ruled for the
Appellant, it would set a precedent which may call into question segments
of common policy language under various insurance policies when
unexpected, uncovered losses could be proximately caused by a covered
loss. The Court will likely uphold the ruling that the wall damage was not
covered with this in mind.
V.

CONCLUSION

State Farm originally covered the roof tear and some mitigation
expenses the Kauls incurred to abide by their policy. The Court will likely
uphold the district court’s findings that, when interpreted in a common
sense meaning, the Policy’s language is clear and unambiguous. The Court
will likely follow the precedent set in Montana and maintain the doctrine
of efficient proximate cause cannot negate specific policy language. The
Court will also likely uphold the district court’s ruling that the policy
requires State Farm to pay Kaul for reasonable expenses incurred to
protect the RV from additional damage, excluding the costs directly
related to the repair of the RV wall.

